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Mr. Ewing's thesis is that employees should be guaranteed some of
the same civil liberties at work that they enjoy, at least in theory, away
from the workplace. "Once a U.S. citizen steps through the plant or
office door at 9 A.M.," Mr. Ewing observes, "he or she is nearly right-
less until 5 P.M., Monday through Friday."'
Much of this book is written in what one can only assume to be
executive patois, with cheery little aphorisms like "I am a small part
of my company, but my company is a big part of me,' 2 or "[i]t's not
the size of the dog in the fight, but the size of the fight in the dog
that counts. ' 3 The analysis draws support from oversimplified history
("Evolution, not revolution, has been the story of rights in America" 4),
a diagram of the hierarchy of human needs, from Level 1 through Lev-
el 5,i and repeated citation of the same handful of cases; and stop signs
appear when the discussion threatens to become too heavy ("we must
be able to conceive of employee rights as a sound and productive part
of the profitmaking process or we cannot make a strong case for
them"0 ).
Style notwithstanding, the substance of Mr. Ewing's argument de-
serves close attention. The central idea in itself is not original.7 Mr.
Ewing, however, has had the patience and courage to spell out in
considerable detail a proposed employee bill of rights.
Mr. Ewing's view of workplace civil liberties can be gleaned from
a number of partial lists at various points in the book. He deals ini-
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tially with the panoply of First Amendment freedoms. To guard free-
dom of speech, he asserts, "[n]o organization or manager shall dis-
charge, demote, or in other ways discriminate against any employee
who criticizes, in speech or press, the ethics, legality, or social respon-
sibility of management actions." But speech should not be protected
when it "rail[s] against the competence of a supervisor or senior man-
ager to make everyday work decisions that have nothing to do with
the legality, morality, or responsibility of management actions." As
to freedom of conscience, Mr. Ewing advocates that an employee
should be able to refuse to carry out an order that he or she sin-
cerely and reasonably believes to be unethical. "On the other hand,
the boss should immediately be free to ask someone else to do the
job."'10 Also,
[s]o long as their activities do not cause palpable harm to the or-
ganization, [employees] should be free to buy whatever products
and services they wish from whatever source; they should be free
to work for political, community, and social causes of their own
choice; they should be free to engage in whatever other outside
activities satisfy them.-1
Mr. Ewing then explicates the right to privacy in considerable de-
tail. He first sets out a series of guidelines for management's collection
and retention of information. For example, management should col-
lect and keep in its personnel files only those facts about employees
that are required by law or that are necessary to manage operations.
Performance evaluations more than three years old should be weeded
out from an employee's file, and employees should be entitled to know
what information about them is on file and how it is being used. An
employee should be entitled to see most of the information on file
about him or her, although an employee should not have access to
"personal evaluations and comments by other employees which could
not reasonably be obtained if confidentiality were not promised."'
12
Reflecting post-Watergate ethics, Mr. Ewing recommends that em-
ployees' conversations (including telephone) and meetings should not
be taped or monitored without the consent of the employees. Nor
should an employer be entitled to check up on an employee's absence
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phone or by sending an investigator to birddog the absentee. In an
employee's absence, mail addressed to him or her may be opened only
by a person in authority and envelopes marked "Personal" may not
be opened by anyone in the organization. Finally, Mr. Ewing seeks
to apply the Fourth Amendment to the workplace by suggesting
that, "[w]hen an employee is away, his desk and personal office files
may be opened only by someone in authority who is looking for spe-
cific items of information needed for operations.'
3
Mr. Ewing would restrict management's use as well as collection
of information. He recommends that no fact in an employee's file be
furnished to an outsider without the employee's consent or a court
order. "In other words, the employer has a fiduciary relationship to
the employee, much as a lawyer does to his client or a doctor to his
patient."' To adapt the employee's right to privacy to employer needs,
Mr. Ewing suggests that employee information should be divided into
two categories: job-related and personal. An employee's supervisors
should have access only to job-related data. Personal data should be
seen only by "personnel officials." 13 And, to prevent altering of a
worker's performance record by doctoring of his files, no information
about an employee should be destroyed without his consent.' 6
Mr. Ewing would also accord to workers a third set of liberties that
he characterizes as due process rights, such as the right to notice: "An
employee who is discharged, demoted, or transferred to a less desirable
job is entitled to a written statement from management of its reasons
for the penalty."' 7 Mr. Ewing would also ensure that "[e]very em-
ployee who feels that he or she has been penalized for asserting any
right described in this bill shall be entitled to a fair hearing before
an impartial official, board, or arbitrator. The findings and conclu-
sions of the hearing shall be delivered in writing to the employee
and management."'
8
Mr. Ewing's bill of rights has some important omissions. In seeking
to protect speech that criticizes the ethics, legality, or social responsi-
bility of management actions, Mr. Ewing's concern is for speech about
corporate action damaging to the public. Mr. Ewing eulogizes em-
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who tried to bring to public attention the defective condition of the
buses they drove.20 He praises workers who refused to record conver-
sations with prospective clients21 or to dump toxic materials into the
Cuyahoga River,22 as well as those who took affirmative action and
"blew the whistle" on improper practices of their governmental em-
ployers23 or who published an article critical of the company in a
community newspaper..2 4 In short, Mr. Ewing defends employees who
have acted like Ralph Nader at the risk of losing their jobs.
Mr. Ewing is much less interested when workers criticize their own
exploitation. Indeed, he is inclined to fire them when they do.
Protection does not extend to employees who make nuisances of
themselves or who balk, argue, or contest managerial decisions on
normal operating and planning matters .... Nor does the protec-
tion extend to individuals who malign the organization. We don't
protect individuals who go around ruining other people's reputa-
tions, and neither should we protect those who vindictively im-
pugn their employers.
25
The analogy of speech critical of a corporation to libel of an indi-
vidual is especially unfortunate. With regard to speech outside the
workplace, the nation has painfully come to the conclusion that penal-
izing criticism of individual governmental officials-the crime of sedi-
tious libel-has no place in the law of the First Amendment.2 6 Criticism
of the boss is the seditious libel of the workplace. For Mr. Ewing it
remains a crime, justifying discharge-industry's form of capital pun-
ishment.
In other ways, too, Mr. Ewing's concept of free speech in the work-
place is significantly less protective than that already sanctioned by
the Supreme Court. Outside the workplace, as previously indicated,
Mr. Ewing would permit an employee to speak and associate freely
unless the activity caused "palpable harm to the organization." Inside
the workplace, Mr. Ewing would restrain speech considered by man-
agement to constitute railing, vindictive impugning, balking, and
other nebulously defined misdeeds without requiring the employer
20. A driver, p. 7.
21. Shirley Zinman, p. 8.
22. A steel worker, pp. 18-19.
23. Ernest Fitzgerald, p. 78.
24. Michael Holodnak, p. 79.
25. Pp. 146-47.
26. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Kalven, The New York
Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Cr.
REv. 191, 204-05 (1964).
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to show that the speech, however irritating, also caused palpable harm.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has found speech in both the
private and public workplaces to be protected unless it causes tangible
disruption.2 7 Moreover, Mr. Ewing proposes a constitutional amend-
ment to create free speech rights in the workplace without mentioning
that the Supreme Court has already held that, within the jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board, an employee's right to free
speech is inalienable in the sense that a union cannot bargain it away. 28
Similarly, Mr. Ewing's notion of conscientious objection predates
development of this concept in selective service cases growing out of
the Vietnam War. He would require "that the conscientious objector
... hold to a view that has some public acceptance. Fad moralities-
messages from flying saucers, mores of occult religious sects, and so
on-do not justify refusal to carry out an order."29 By contrast, since
United States v. Seeger,30 a conscientious objector to military service
has been required to show only that "a given belief that is sincere
and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly quali-
fies for the exemption."
3'
The limitations of Mr. Ewing's approach become especially apparent
when one turns to enforcement of procedural rights. Mr. Ewing has a
tendency to equate "senior managers" with impartial magistrates. Thus
he considers it the functional equivalent of a magistrate's search war-
rant if a "senior manager . . . has sound reason to believe that the
[absent employee's] files contain information needed for a manage-
ment decision."32 The hearing Mr. Ewing has in mind would ordinarily
be a hearing "in the employer organization"33 presided over by officers
of the very company that initiated the discipline at issue. Wherever the
hearing is held, moreover, in Mr. Ewing's view it should lack certain
rights considered integral to due process outside the workplace.
27. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969) (school pupils could not be suspended for wearing armbands when action did not
materially and substantially disrupt operation of school); Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968) (public school teacher's statements did not warrant his dis-
missal where they did not interfere with operation of schools); Republic Aviation Corp.
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945) (upholding presumption that rules against union solici-
tation are invalid in absence of proof of necessity for maintaining production and dis-
cipline).
28. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1974) (union may not enter
agreement with employer limiting in-plant communications).
29. P. 148.
30. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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The employee is guilty until proven innocent. "The burden should
be on him or her to offer clear and convincing evidence. It should not
be up to the employer to prove that the discharge was for incom-
petence, laziness, or economic reasons. If the burden of proof is on
the employer, managers will be inhibited from building the most able
and efficient staffs they can."
34
There is no right to judgment by a jury of one's peers. The closest
Mr. Ewing comes to the Sixth Amendment is to praise a procedure
in one company where the employee appears before "five non-manage-
ment employees, chosen at random," who in turn report their findings
of fact to the company president, who "renders a decision." 35
There is no equality before the "law of the workplace." Nothing in
Mr. Ewing's book begins to suggest that a "senior manager" who vin-
dictively impugned an employee would be subject to the same sum-
mary discharge as an employee who rails against a boss, or that a
supervisor starting a fight would be evenhandedly disciplined under
the shop rule prohibiting fighting by hourly workers.
Mr. Ewing, then, sacrifices workplace civil liberties when they
threaten to cut too sharply into managerial efficiency. He also fails
to recognize that the arguments that underlie extending such liberties
to industrial relations at all-the predominant role of the job in each
worker's life and the fundamental human need for self-development
and independence-also support establishment of a more democratic
structure for all decisions made in the workplace. The logical conclu-
sion of his reasoning is not, as Mr. Ewing contends, autocratic manage-
ment limited by specific rights. Rather, it is some form of workplace
democracy where the employees themselves decide not only what civil
liberties should be protected but also how leisure should be balanced
against income, whether better working conditions are worth some
loss of profits, and how the work itself should be done.
Part of Mr. Ewing's unwillingness to push his thesis farther seems
to be based on a foreshortened sense of history. Repeatedly he insists
that lack of democracy in the workplace has become a concern "only
in recent years;"3 6 that prior to the 1950s "employee constitutionalism
was hypothetical"; 37 that in the nineteenth century "[p]erhaps the most
important source of support of employer prerogatives was the attitude
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as a rule, they were content to let wisdom and insight reside in the
heads of organizations." 38
This picture of the past overlooks, first, the Jeffersonian sentiment
that there can be no democracy unless every man is his own boss and
that factory labor is a form of slavery. Early in the industrial revolu-
tion, American workers responded to the factory system with demands
for more freedom at work.39 More immediately pertinent, Mr. Ewing's
notion that efforts to bring constitutional liberties to the workplace
began in the 1950s distorts history. By far the strongest thrust in re-
cent years toward both workplace democracy and employee civil liber-
ties coincided with the CIO insurgency in the years 1935-1947. The
1950s represented the quiescence of this movement, not its birth.
During the New Deal years, labor won a wide variety of employee
liberties. Under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, work-
ers attained the right to associate for mutual aid or protection, a work-
place analogue of the First Amendment right, and the right to be
represented by agents of their own choosing, an equivalent for the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.40 In a series of dramatic Supreme
38. P. 35 (emphasis in original).
39. For instance, Seth Luther, in his Address to the Working Men of New England,
denounced the "prisons of New England called cotton mills." See 1 P. FONER, HISTORY
OF THE LA3OR MOVENIENT IN THE UNITED STATES 106 (1947). Striking mill girls themselves
appealed to newspaper editors "opposed to the system of slavery attempted to be estab-
lished in our manufacturing establishment." Id. at 109. During a strike of children for
the reduction of the work day to 11 hours, a committee of workingmen from a neighbor-
ing city reported that conditions in the Paterson mills
belong rather to the dark ages than to the present times, and would be more con-
genial to the climate of his majesty the emperor and autocrAt of all of the Russias,
than this "land of the free and the home of the brave," this boasted asylum for the
oppressed of all nations.
Id. at 111.
Several recent studies have traced this sentiment into the second half of the nineteenth
century. Alan Dawley, for example, describes the century-long militance of the shoemakers
of Lynn, Massachusetts. In 1870, a Labor Reform convention sponsored by the Knights
of St. Crispin declared:
We claim, that although the masses have advanced towards independence, they will
never be completely free from vassalage until they have thrown off the system of
working for hire. Men working for wages are, in greater or less degree, in the bonds
of serfdom. The demand and supply of labor makes them the football of circum-
stances. Today, independent of all appearance; tomorrow, the veriest slave, begging
for work, that he may earn a crust to sustain a miserable existence.
A. DAWLEY, CLASS AND COMMUNITY: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN LYNN 198 (1976). Sum-
marizing, Professor Dawley declares that "facile generalizations about the popular ac-
ceptance of business leadership at all levels of life and notions of America as a middle-
class society do not square with examples like Lynn," and he notes that labor maintained
a similarly extensive influence in other industrial communities throughout the nation.
Id. at 228.
40. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 7, Pub. L. No. 74-198 (current version
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970)).
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Court cases, employees won the First Amendment right to free speech
in and near the workplace.
41
Any doubt about whether the congressional mandate and these court
decisions reflected a desire to extend constitutional rights to the work-
place is settled by examining the NLRB briefs in such cases as Re-
public Aviation.42 Drawing on First Amendment ideas just then gain-
ing currency from the Supreme Court decisions concerning the Je-
hovah's Witnesses, 43 the Board successfully argued to the Court that
section 7 should be read to incorporate the concepts of overbreadth,
of chilling effect, and of the irrelevance of alternative speech oppor-
tunities. Furthermore, section 7 would require a showing of substantial
and material disruption-the workplace equivalent of clear and present
danger-before speech might be restrained. 44 The same concepts have
subsequently been elaborated in public employee speech cases, such as
Pickering v. Board of Education,45 which upheld the right of a teacher
to criticize school board policy. But, contrary to Mr. Ewing's view of
history, the Court in that case adopted ideas already well established
in the private sphere more than twenty years earlier.
Mr. Ewing's disregard for the union movement and its judicial
achievements suggests a disturbing thought. Perhaps Mr. Ewing's con-
stitutionalism-without-unions is a resurrection of the movement for
"industrial democracy," more aptly characterized as company union-
ism, that flourished in the 1920s. 46 Perhaps what Mr. Ewing is advo-
cating is a way for companies to head off unionism among their em-
ployees by creating from above a facsimile of the rights unionism
would provide.
Let us consider, in fairness, the rebuttals that Mr. Ewing might offer
to this hypothesis. If the creation of unions were strictly limited and
41. These decisions included Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (municipal streets and
parks are public forums subject to First Amendment easement) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946) (First Amendment also extends to similar areas in privately owned com-
pany town); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (state may not impose prior restraint
on First Amendment activity by requiring union organizers to be licensed); Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 94 (1940) (pickets who "appear to have been on company
property" were engaged in protected speech because "[i]n the circumstances of our times
the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be re-
garded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution");
and Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (employee speech on employer's
property is presumptively protected if it occurs during nonworking time).
42. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
43. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 150 (1939) (municipality may not use
police power in restraint of freedom of speech and press).
44. See Lynd, Employee Speech in the Private and Public Workplace: Two Doctrines
or One?, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 711, 717-19 (1977).
45. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
46. Cf. W. LAUCK, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DMocRAcY, 1776-1926 (1926) (compendium
of "employee representation" plans).
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if most workers were obligated to remain unorganized, there might be
cause for focusing on the implementation of specific rights to the ex-
clusion of unionization. Mr. Ewing rightly points out that fifty million
employees in the private sector do not belong to unions. He also ob-
serves correctly that in its recent Bell Aerospace decision, 47 the Su-
preme Court held that managerial employees are not covered by the
National Labor Relations Act.48 But the bulk of nonunionized em-
ployees in the private sector are covered by the National Labor Re-
lations Act and their obvious first step toward civil liberties in the
workplace would be to seek collective bargaining recognition.
Again rightly, Mr. Ewing indicates that many unions "seem to be
as despotic and corrupt as the worst corporate management teams"
and that union organizations "are subject to the same managerial dis-
eases as other types of organizations."4 9 These are reasons to wage a
vigorous struggle for internal union democracy. They are not reasons
for preferring a company-initiated grievance plan to a union as a
means of protecting employee rights against management.
In addition, the civil liberties Mr. Ewing is most concerned to pro-
tect are not necessarily protected by section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, because section 7 protects protest only when it is related
to wages, hours, and working conditions, and is the concerted action
of more than one person. Hence the single person seeking to prevent
a company from marketing an unsafe product may get no help from
the Board. Mr. Ewing performs a service in highlighting the plight
of such individuals. Surely, however, protection should be extended
to persons thus situated in addition to the more prosaic safeguards
provided by unions, rather than as an alternative to unionism.
Mr. Ewing's strongest rebuttal to the charge of antiunionism is a
passage in which he advocates that unions bargain collectively for
civil liberties.
Is there any reason that employee unions or associations cannot
write civil liberties into the contract? Apparently this step has not
yet been taken. Judging from the general trend in collective bar-
gaining, however, there seems to be no reason that it cannot be
done-and the movement is unmistakably in this direction. For
example, unions have been going outside the conventional scope
of work conditions and dealing with problems of sexism in the
office.... Also, unions are becoming ever more conscious of the
47. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
48. Public supervisory and managerial employees can join unions under the laws of
some states. See, e.g., Seattle v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587, No. 44441 (Wash-
ington Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 1977).
49. Pp. 165-66.
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rights of minorities, as spelled out in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. If union officials consider rights
like these important, surely they can add others to the list.,;O
This is a most creative suggestion and, whatever may be Mr. Ewing's
overall views about unions, it deserves to be pursued. In my judgment,
Mr. Ewing is quite right to believe that bargaining for civil liberties
is at the edge of the possible. In the recent contest for president of
the United Steelworkers of America, both candidates espoused the
idea that an employee should be innocent until proven guilty: that
is, the employee should remain at his or her job, at regular pay, until
any discipline sought by management has been finally adjudicated.rl
Perhaps the best way to sum up the sense in which Mr. Ewing is
antiunion is to clarify the degree to which he is promanagement. The
parameters of this book were established by polls and surveys addressed
by Mr. Ewing to corporate executives;52 its audience, clearly, is man-
agement (see, for example, Chapter 4: "Are Employee Rights A Threat
To Capitalism?"). Mr. Ewing believes that rights can be established
for individual employees without changing the fundamental allocation
of power between management and labor. Inevitably, then, he must
persuade himself that power will yield without a demand: that the
corporate hierarchy, guided by enlightened self-interest, will itself set
in motion the changes needed to make the work environment more
decent and humane. This is paternalism. Even if feasible, Mr. Ewing's
program would be humiliating to workers in a way that Mr. Ewing
does not seem to perceive. And implementation of the program is not
possible, because, on Mr. Ewing's logic, decency must give way when
it conflicts with profit.
In short, Mr. Ewing's constitutionalism is constitutional monarchy.
Mr. Ewing expressly rejects the idea that individual rights must be
protected by democratic self-government: the idea, in the words of
the Declaration of Independence, that "to secure these rights, govern-
ments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed." According to Mr. Ewing:
No realist will argue that companies, government bureaus, and
other public agencies should be run democratically. 5
Employees accept that management must manage, that the boss
50. P. 164.
51. See The Youngstown Vindicator, Sept. 28, 1976, at 21; id., Feb. 7, 1977, at 15.
52. Mr. Ewing polled the 3,500-plus subscribers of the Harvard Business Review in
1971 and again in 1977. See pp. 18, 25 n.12, 118-19.
53. P. 21.
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has to make planning and operating decisions. This understanding
comes as naturally as that a football or baseball team can't operate
democratically."
Of course, it would be unperceptive and unrealistic to try to apply
the Bill of Rights across the board. Companies and public organi-
zations cannot be run like democracies, their officials elected by
ballot, their directives subjected to referendum, their day-to-day
decisions debated-at least, not if they are also to be efficient.55
Such is the view from the Harvard Business School. But it is not the
view from the assembly lines and blast furnaces, where thoughtful men
and women are convinced that work goes better when the foreman is
sick and will tell you of the endless inefficiency and unresponsiveness
to suggestion of those who give them orders. Any philosophy of em-
ployee rights that is to take root and grow in this ultimately democratic
country must speak for, and be accountable to, employees themselves.
54. P. 42.
55. P. 218.
895
